

## Message Text

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EXDIS

FOLLOWING TELEGRAM FROM USNATO DATED DECEMBER 10,  
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S E C R E T USNATO 6794

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E.O. 11652: GDS  
TAGS: NATO, PFOR  
SUBJECT: NORTH ATLANTIC COUNCIL MINISTERIAL DECEMBER 9--RESTRICTED  
SESSION

1. SUMMARY: RESTRICTED SESSION OF NAC MINISTERIAL CONSTITUTED  
PRINCIPAL DISCUSSION AMONG ALLIED MINISTERS ON EAST-WEST  
RELATIONS AND THE STATE OF THE ALLIANCE. FOLLOWING INITIAL  
PRESENTATION BY THE SECRETARY, OTHER MINISTERS COMMENTED ON  
THE RANGE OF ISSUES FACING WESTERN COUNTRIES. SYG LUNS'  
SUMMARY OF MINISTERS' COMMENTS WILL BE TRANSMITTED BY SEPTTEL.  
END SUMMARY.

2. CAGLAYANGIL (TURKEY) NOTED THAT SOVIET ATTITUDES WITH  
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REGARD TO DETENTE REMAIN UNCLEAR. WHAT IS ONE TO THINK,

HE ASKED, OF THE APPARENT SOVIET EFFORT TO MODIFY THE MILITARY BALANCE IN THEIR FAVOR, AND TO PURSUE DETENTE WHILE AT THE SAME TIME PROMOTING IDEOLOGICAL STRUGGLE AND SUBSERVSION. WHILE THEY ARE CONTINUING THEIR MILITARY BUILDUP, THEY ENGAGE IN SUBTLE PROGRAGANDA DESIGNED TO MISLEAD WESTERN PUBLIC OPINION ABOUT THE REAL NATURE OF THEIR ACTIVITIES. THERE IS NO EVIDENCE THAT THE SOVIETS HAVE ABANDONED THEIR EVENTUAL AIM OF DOMINATION OVER THE WEST.

3. DESPITE THIS BACKGROUND, THE WEST SHOULD CONTINUE TO SEEK AGREEMENTS WITH THE USSR WHEN THESE ARE POSSIBLE, AND TURKEY IS CONVINCED THAT INDIVIDUAL ALLIES WILL NOT MAKE UNILATERAL AND UNBALANCED CONCESSIONS. CAGLAYANGIL SAID IT IS VITALLY IMPORTANT THAT NATO NOT ACCEPT FORMULAS IN MBFR WHICH WOULD WEAKEN ITS DEFENSES, INCLUDING THOSE OF THE ALLIANCE'S FLANKS. HE AGREED WITH THOSE WHO FAVOR CONTINUED ECONOMIC EXCHANGES WITH THE EAST WHICH WOULD CREATE GROWING INTERDEPENDENCE, AND THUS REDUCE THE POSSIBILITY OF SUDDEN DANGEROUS ACTIONS BY THE WARSAW PACT. SUCH A POLICY SHOULD BE ACCOMPANIED BY MEASURES THAT WILL ENSURE CONTINUED WESTERN TECHNOLOGICAL SUPERIORITY. WITH REGARD TO CSCE, THE TURKISH FONMIN SAID THAT REAL BASKET III IMPROVEMENTS WOULD REQUIRE A LONG-TERM EFFORT. TURKEY BELIEVES THAT THE WEST SHOULD AVOID TACTICS WHICH MIGHT LEAD TO A HARDENING OF EASTERN ATTITUDES AND THUS UNDERMINE OUR LONG-TERM OBJECTIVES. IN RELATIONS WITH THE THIRD WORLD, CSCE GIVES THE WEST A REAL OPPORTUNITY TO SHOW THE MORAL SUPERIORITY OF WESTERN SOCIETIES. CAGLAYANGIL SAID HIS COUNTRY WAS PREPARED TO HAVE BALANCED TIES WITH ITS NEIGHBORS WHICH INVOLVE ECONOMIC AND TECHNICAL COOPERATION. HE PUT SPECIAL EMPHASIS ON THE IMPORTANCE OF THE INTEGRITY AND NEUTRALITY OF YUGOSLAVIA.

4. CAGLAYANGIL SAID INCREASED WESTERN DEFENSE EFFORTS WERE THE ONLY WAY TO CONVINCE THE USSR THAT PEACE IS A PAYING PROPOSITION. THE ALLIES SHOULD SEE EAST-WEST RELATIONS IN A GLOBAL CONTEXT. THE PEOPLES OF SOUTHERN AFRICA MUST BE CONVINCED THAT THE WEST SUPPORTS THEIR

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ASPIRATIONS. THE EFFORTS MADE BY SECRETARY KISSINGER WERE VERY IMPORTANT, AND CAGLAYANGIL HOPED THE US INITIATIVE WOULD SUCCEED. WHILE SEEKING TO PERSUADE THE THIRD WORLD COUNTRIES OF THE NECESSITY OF WORKING WITHIN THE FRAMEWORK OF INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC MECHANISMS, PROPOSALS PUT FORWARD BY THE WEST THUS FAR ARE ONLY FIRST STEPS TOWARD ESTABLISHMENT OF A REAL DIALOGUE. CAGLAYANGIL REFERRED TO DIMINISHED SOVIET INFLUENCE

IN BOTH EGYPT AND SYRIA AND THE MORE FLEXIBLE ATTITUDE THE ARAB GOVERNMENTS HAVE RECENTLY SHOWN TOWARD THE MIDDLE EAST PROBLEM. IN HIS VIEW, IT WAS IMPORTANT THAT THE WESTERN COUNTRIES WHICH ENJOY INFLUENCE IN "THE OTHER CAMP" COUNSEL A CORRESPONDING MODERATION AND FLEXIBILITY THERE. AS TO SOVIET-CHINESE RELATIONS, CAGLAYANGIL SAW POSSIBILITIES FOR SOME IMPROVEMENTS, BUT THOUGHT IT UNLIKELY THAT PEKING WOULD EVER RETURN TO A SUBORDINATE ROLE VIS-A-VIS THE USSR.

5. CAGLAYANGIL CONTINUED THAT, ON OCCASION, CONFLICTS ARISE AMONG INDIVIDUAL ALLIES BUT SUCH DIFFICULTIES SHOULD BE RESOLVED THROUGH NEGOTIATIONS. IT IS, HOWEVER, UNTHINKABLE FOR OTHERS TO PUT PRESSURE ON PARTIES INVOLVED IN SUCH DISPUTES FOR SUCH PRESSURE CAN BE HARMFUL TO ALLIED SOLIDARITY. HE CALLED FOR THE PROMPT AND UNCONDITIONAL APPROVAL OF THE DEFENSE AGREEMENTS BETWEEN THE UNITED STATES AND "TWO SOUTHEAST EUROPEAN NEIGHBORING COUNTRIES". IN CONCLUSION, CAGLAYANGIL PAID TRIBUTE TO THE WORK OF SECRETARY KISSINGER, EXPRESSING THE HOPE THAT THE SECRETARY'S THOUGHT WOULD CONTINUE TO INSPIRE THE ALLIES.

6. GENSCHER (FRG) WAS SURE THAT SECRETARY KISSINGER'S INFLUENCE WOULD CONTINUE, AND THAT THE SECRETARY WOULD KEEP A CRITICAL EYE ON FUTURE ALLIED CONSULTATIONS. GENSCHER ALSO EXPRESSED APPRECIATION FOR THE MESSAGE FROM PRESIDENT-ELECT CARTER. THIS MESSAGE DEMONSTRATED THE CONTINUITY OF US POLICY AND WAS THE RESULT OF THE AMERICAN PERCEPTION OF THE OBJECTIVE REALITIES. THE WEST, GENSCHER CONTINUED, CAN ASSURE ITS CONTINUED SECURITY IF IT HAS THE WILL. MOREOVER, THE ALLIES SHOULD NOT NEGLECT EVENTS TAKING PLACE OUTSIDE THE  
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TREATY AREA BECAUSE SHIFTS IN THE MILITARY ADD POLITICAL BALANCE IN SUCH AREAS CAN HAVE AN IMPACT ON WESTERN SECURITY. THIS IS ILLUSTRATED BY CURRENT SOVIET POLICY IN AFRICA, AND GENSCHER SAID HE SHARED THE VIEW THAT RECENT SOVIET ACTIONS ARE NOT THE RESULT OF A LONG-TERM DESIGN, BUT RATHER THE EXPLOITATION OF OPPORTUNITIES WHICH HAD PRESENTED THEMSELVES. DEVELOPMENTS IN SOUTHERN AFRICA ARE PARTICULARLY IMPORTANT AND THE WEST SHOULD CONTINUE TO PROMOTE NEW POLITICAL STRUCTURES IN THAT REGION. IN GENSCHER'S VIEW, SUCH A POLICY WAS THE ONLY WAY TO PREVENT THE COMMUNIST POWERS FROM BECOMING THE SPOKESMEN FOR THE ASPIRATIONS OF THE PEOPLES OF SOUTHERN AFRICA. THUS, WESTERN POLICY IN THAT AREA INVOLVED BOTH PRINCIPLES AND THE WEST'S OWN SECURITY.

7. GENSCHER ALSO AGREED THAT THE WEST'S READINESS TO DEFEND ITSELF MUST BE ACCOMPANIED BY A WILLINGNESS TO PURSUE DETENTE. IN THIS CONNECTION, THE ALLIES NEED A CLEAR DEFINITION OF WHAT CAN REALISTICALLY BE DONE TO MITIGATE POINTS OF CONFLICT WITH THE EAST. A CONDITION FOR SUCH PROGRESS IN DETENTE, HOWEVER, IS THE MAINTENANCE OF AN ACTIVE AND HEALTHY ALLIANCE. IN 1977, GENSCHER ADDED, WE CAN EXPECT A SOVIET PROPAGANDA CAMPAIGN IN CONNECTION WITH THE BELGRADE MEETINGS. HE AGREED THAT THE WEST WILL NEED TO REPLY TO WARSAW PACT INITIATIVES BUT IN A WAY THAT DOES NOT WEAKEN OUR DEFENSE CAPABILITIES. WITH REGARD TO THE WP PROPOSAL FOR FREEZING MEMBERSHIP IN NATO AND THE PACT, GENSCHER RECALLED THAT THE CSCE FINAL ACT REITERATED THE RIGHT OF ANY NATION TO JOIN AN ALLIANCE. WE SHOULD STRESS, GENSCHER CONTINUED, THAT WESTERN DEFENSE EFFORTS ARE A DANGER ONLY TO THOSE WHO WOULD SEEK TO ATTACK US. HE SUGGESTED THAT GOVERNMENTS INFORM THEIR PUBLICS OF THE CONCLUSIONS ABOUT THE EAST-WEST MILITARY EQUATION REACHED BY THE DEFENSE MINISTERS.

8. WITH REGARD TO THE BELGRADE CONFERENCE, GENSCHER SAID THAT THE ALLIES SHOULD PREPARE VERY CAREFULLY AND IT WAS IMPORTANT THAT THE WEST NOT BE SIDETRACKED FROM THE MAIN PURPOSE OF THE CSCE REVIEW MEETINGS. TURNING TO MBFR, HE SAID THE WEST MUST RESPECT CERTAIN PRINCIPLES  
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IN THESE NEGOTIATIONS: (A) SOLIDARITY MUST BE PRESERVED AND THERE IS NO ROOM FOR "SOLO PERFORMANCES", (B) PARITY IS AN INALIENABLE OBJECTIVE AND THERE IS NO SCOPE FOR NATIONAL LIMITATIONS, (C) ANY AGREEMENT SHOULD NOT AFFECT COOPERATION AMONG MBFR PARTICIPANTS AND NON-PARTICIPANTS NOR COMPROMISE FUTURE EUROPEAN DEFENSE COOPERATION.

9. IN RELATIONS WITH THE THIRD WORLD, GENSCHER CONTINUED, THE WEST HAS BEEN TOO DEFENSIVE AND SHOULD CEASE TRYING TO EXPIATE FOR THE COLONIAL PAST. RATHER, THE ALLIES SHOULD PROMOTE THE THEME OF THE NEED FOR WORLD-WIDE ECONOMIC SOLIDARITY AND THE CONCEPT THAT THE COMMUNIST COUNTRIES SHOULD ALSO PARTICIPATE IN THE COMMON EFFORT. HE NOTED THAT REPRESENTATIVES OF THE COMMUNIST COUNTRIES SOMETIMES ADVISE WESTERNERS IN PRIVATE NOT TO MAKE TOO MANY CONCESSIONS. FROM THIS GENSCHER CONCLUDED THAT THE ALLIES SHOULD TAKE A MORE AGGRESSIVE STANCE IN THE NORTH-SOUTH DIALOGUE AND NOT GIVE THE COMMUNIST COUNTRIES A FREE RIDE.

10. CROSLAND (UK) SAID DETENTE HAD PRODUCED A MODUS

VIVENDI BETWEEN THE GREAT POWERS, SOME ADVANCE TOWARD CRISIS MANAGEMENT IN EUROPE AND OTHER PARTS OF THE WORLD, AND SOME STEPS TOWARDS A HEALTHIER ATMOSPHERE IN RELATIONS BETWEEN EAST AND WEST. THE ALLIANCE MUST DETERMINE HOW TO MOVE AHEAD WITH THIS PROCESS IN THE CONTEXT OF AN ADVERSARY RELATIONSHIP. THE HELSINKI FINAL ACT WAS CLEARLY A SIGNIFICANT ACCOMPLISHMENT FOR THE WEST, NOT ONLY IN BASKET III, BUT ALSO IN THE INTANGIBLE SENSE THAT, HAVING BEEN PUBLISHED BY THE EASTERN EUROPEAN COUNTRIES, IT SERVED AS AN INSPIRATION FOR THOSE IN EASTERN EUROPE WHO WERE SEEKING TO BROADEN THEIR LIBERTIES. IT WAS ESSENTIAL FOR THE WEST TO PRESS THIS ASPECT OF HELSINKI, BECAUSE IF THE WEST FAILED TO DO SO IT WOULD UNDERMINE A VITAL SYMBOL FOR THOSE WHO WERE LEADING THE STRUGGLE FOR A MORE HUMANE EXISTENCE IN EASTERN EUROPE.

11. WHILE GIVING THE FINAL ACT ITS DUE WEIGHT AS A LONG-TERM CHARTER FOR EAST-WEST RELATIONS, THE ALLIES  
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MUST REMEMBER THAT BASKET III IS NOT THE CORE OF DETENTE, WHICH RESTS ON SECURITY AND ECONOMIC RELATIONS. THE ALLIES MUST MAINTAIN A MILITARY BALANCE IN THE FACE OF INCREASED SOVIET STRENGTH. THE ALLIES MUST PURSUE THEIR OBJECTIVES IN SALT AND MBFR AND MAKE CLEAR TO PUBLIC OPINION THAT THE HUMAN ASPECTS OF DETENTE WILL ULTIMATELY COUNT FOR LITTLE UNLESS THE SOVIETS CAN BE BROUGHT TO CONTRIBUTE TO PROGRESS IN THESE NEGOTIATIONS. WHILE SOME PROGRESS IN SALT IS LIKELY NEXT YEAR\* THE SAME CANNOT BE SAID ABOUT MBFR. NEVERTHELESS, THE ALLIES SHOULD ATTEMPT TO CREATE PRESSURE ON THE SOVIETS FOR PROGRESS IN MBFR, TO MAKE CLEAR THAT THERE CAN BE NO REAL DETENTE WITHOUT DETENTE ON SECURITY ISSUES, AND THAT PROPAGANDA EXERCISES LIKE THE WARSAW PACT DECLARATION ARE NO SUBSTITUTE FOR SERIOUS PROGRESS IN CONCRETE NEGOTIATIONS.

12. IN THE ECONOMIC AREA, CROSLAN SAID, THE SOVIETS BENEFIT ENORMOUSLY FROM THEIR RELATIONSHIP WITH THE WEST, WHILE SOVIET AID TO THIRD WORLD COUNTRIES IS AT A DEPLORABLE LEVEL -- ABOUT 4 PERCENT OF THAT OF OECD COUNTRIES--WITH THE EXCEPTION OF SOVIET ARMS DELIVERIES, AN AREA ON WHICH THE SOVIETS PREFER TO CONCENTRATE. CROSLAN FORESAW CONSIDERABLE POTENTIAL FOR FRICTION IN EAST-WEST ECONOMIC RELATIONS, PARTICULARLY IN THE AREA OF SOVIET FISHING, SHIPPING, AND DUMPING OF PRODUCTS IN WESTERN MARKETS. THE ALLIES SHOULD THEREFORE LOOK CAREFULLY AT THE QUESTION OF HOW TO DEVELOP BALANCED TRADE WITH THE EAST WHILE NOT SIMPLY TRANSFERRING RESOURCES TO THE SOVIETS AND GRANTING THEM THE BENEFITS

OF WESTERN MARKETS. CROSLAND THOUGHT IT NECESSARY TO TAKE A MUCH MORE CAREFUL LOOK AT CREDITS, WHICH SHOULD ONLY BE EXTENDED TO THE SOVIETS ON A COMMERCIAL BASIS.

13. IN PREPARING FOR BELGRADE, THE WEST SHOULD EXPECT A BARRAGE OF NEW PROPOSALS FROM THE SOVIETS AIMED AT OBSCURING THE ISSUE OF IMPLEMENTATION AND ESTABLISHING THE SLOGAN THAT THE SOVIETS WANTED TO LOOK FORWARD, NOT BACKWARDS. THE BREZHNEV PROPOSALS AND THE WARSAW PACT DECLARATION WERE INDICATIVE OF THE DIFFICULTIES THE WEST COULD EXPECT IN THIS AREA. THE SOVIETS WOULD STRIVE TO CRETE DIVISIONS AMONG THE WESTERN COUNTRIES  
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AT BELGRADE AND TO BRING THE NEUTRALS TO A POSITION MORE CRITICAL OF THE WEST THAN OF THE USSR. THE NON-FIRST-USE PROPOSAL WAS DUSTED OFF FOR THIS PURPOSE, WITH A VIEW TOWARD PAINTING THE WESTERN PARTICIPANTS AS THOSE THAT WANT TO PICK QUARRELS OVER IMPLEMENTATION, AND INTERGERE IN THE INTERNAL AFFAIRS OF OTHERS, WHILE THE SOVIETS WERE PREPARED TO LOOK TO THE FUTURE. THE BEST WAY TO DEAL WITH SOVIET TACTICS, CROSLAND BELIEVED, WAS TO KEEP OUR ATTENTION AND THE ATTENTION OF OUR PUBLICS ON THE ISSUE OF IMPLEMENTATION OF THE FINAL ACT.

14. TURNING TO RHODESIA, CROSLAND EMPHASIZED THAT WITHOUT SECRETARY KISSINGERS' COURAGEOUS AND AUDACIOUS EFFORTS, THERE WOULD HAVE BEEN NO GENEVA CONFERENCE. LIKE THE U.S., CROSLAND CONSIDERED IT AXIOMATIC THAT THE SOVIETS WISHED TO EXTEND THEIR INFLUENCE IN SOUTHERN AFRICA. AT THE SAME TIME, THE DIFFICULTIES ENCOUNTERED AT GENEVA WERE NOT DUE PRIMARILY TO SOVIET INTERVENTION. SMITH WAS IN PART RESPONSIBLE FOR THESE DIFFICULTIES, BUT MORE IMPORTANT WAS THE SHIFT IN THE POSITION OF THE FRONT-LINE AFRICAN COUNTRIES. WHEN THE INITIATIVE TOWARD NEGOTIATIONS WAS FIRST LAUNCHED, IT APPEARED THAT THE FRONT-LINE COUNTRIES WOULD SUPPORT THE "FIVE POINTS". NOW HOWEVER THEY REJECTED THE CONCEPT OF SHARING POWER DURING AN INTERIM PERIOD IN FAVOR OF AN IMMEDIATE TRANSFER OF POWER WITH NO INTER-MEDIATE PHASE. THIS SHIFT HAD OPENED UP A WIDE GAP BETWEEN THE POSITION OF THE AFRICANS AND THAT OF SMITH. IN THIS SITUATION, IT MIGHT APPEAR TEMPTING TO SIMPLY ABANDON THE EFFORT AND TO ALLOW THE GUERRILLA WAR TO TAKE ITS COURSE SINCE IN THE END SMITH WOULD LOSE IN ANY EVENT. IF THIS COURSE WAS ADOPTED, HOWEVER, THE TRANSFER OF POWER WOULD TAKE PLACE IN CIRCUMSTANCES THAT WOULD UNDERCUT COMPLETELY THE POSITION OF THE MODERATE RHODESIAN LEADERS WHO WOULD DISAPPEAR AND BE REPLACED BY A NEW GENERATION OF LEADERS, UNKNOWN TO THE WEST,

WHO WOULD BE HEAVILY INFLUENCED BY MARXIST BELIEFS AND BY MOZAMBIQUE. THIS COURSE WOULD ALSO ENTAIL LIKELY INTERVENTION ON THE PART OF SOUTH AFRICA - AND OF CUBA. THE AFRICAN LEADERS DID NOT WANT CUBA TO INTERVENE BUT MIGHT NOT BE ABLE TO RESIST SUCH INTER-  
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VENTION IN CERTAIN CIRCUMSTANCES. AGAINST THIS BACKGROUND, CROSLAND HAD SUMMONED IVOR RICHARD BACK TO LONDON TO CONSULT WITH HIM AND SECRETARY KISSINGER TOMORROW IN AN EFFORT TO SPUR FURTHER PROGRESS. ON THE ROLE OF THE UK, CROSLAND NOTED THAT HIS GOVERNMENT WAS UNDER PRESSURE FROM MANY SOURCES TO INTERVENE MORE ACTIVELY. HMG WOULD BE WILLING TO DO SO TO A LIMITED DEGREE IF IT WERE A QUESTION OF ASSUMING SOME RESTRICTED FUNCTIONS FOR AN INTERIM PERIOD. BUT THE UK COULD NOT RESUME FULL COLONIAL RESPONSIBILITIES, AS SOME AFRICANS WANTED THE UK TO DO, SINCE IN FACT THE UK HAD NOT EXERCISED SUCH AUTHORITY IN RHODESIA FOR A LONG TIME. MOREOVER, THE UK WOULD NOT BE PREPARED TO SEND TROOPS TO RHODESIA SINCE IT COULD ONLY DO SO BY DETACHING BRITISH TROOPS FROM THEIR NATO COMMITMENTS AND SUCH A COURSE WOULD BE UNACCEPTABLE. THE UK WOULD DEVOTE ITS FULL EFFORTS TO ACHIEVING A PEACEFUL TRANSFER OF POWER IN RHODESIA SHORT OF THE LIMITATIONS CROSLAND MENTIONED. IN ASSESSING THE ABILITY OF THE WEST TO COPE WITH THE CHALLENGE WHICH IT FACES, CROSLAND WAS REASSURED BY THE HEALTHY SKEPTICISM WITH WHICH THE WEST HAD REACTED IN THE POST-HELSINKI PERIOD. WESTERN LEADERS, HE BELIEVED, SHOULD ENCOURAGE ROBUST SKEPTICISM ON THE PART OF THEIR PUBLICS. REGARDING SOVIET INTENTIONS.

15. FORLANI EMPHASIZED DEVELOPING REAL SOLIDARITY AMONG THE ALLIES TO RESPOND TO THE UNCERTAINTIES OF THE CURRENT ECONOMIC, POLITICAL AND MILITARY SITUATION. A PRINCIPAL ELEMENT OF THIS SITUATION WAS THE SOVIET MILITARY THREAT AND SOVIET PROPAGANDA PROPOSALS LIKE THE WARSAW PACT NON-FIRST-USE PROPOSAL. THE PRESENCE OF THE SOVIET FLEET IN THE MEDITERRANEAN, THE CONVENTIONAL CAPABILITIES OF THE WARSAW PACT IN CENTRAL EUROPE, THE INCREASING TECHNICAL AND NUCLEAR CAPABILITIES OF THE WARSAW PACT WERE OF GREAT CONCERN TO A COUNTRY LIKE ITALY, WHICH WAS LOCATED IN AN AREA WHERE THE MAINTENANCE OF THE MILITARY BALANCE WAS CRUCIAL. MOREOVER, THE STRUCTURAL CHANGES IN THE WARSAW PACT RESULTING FROM THE BUCHAREST MEETING APPEAR TO CIRCUMSCRIBE TO SOME EXTENT THE MANEUVERING ROOM OF THE SMALLER WP COUNTRIES THAT MIGHT NOW BE TIED IN MORE CLOSELY TO SOVIET POLICIES.  
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16. COMMENTING ON THE PERSISTENT ECONOMIC CRISES IN THE WEST, FORLANI SAID IT WAS DIFFICULT FOR THE ALLIES TO MATCH WARSAW PACT MILITARY EFFORTS IN PRESENT CIRCUMSTANCES. THE SECURITY OF SOUTHERN EUROPE WAS PARTICULARLY VULNERABLE TO THE INFLUENCE OF A DETERIORATING ECONOMIC SITUATION. MOREOVER, SOUTHERN EUROPE WAS MORE EXPOSED THAN THE CENTRAL REGION TO THE POSSIBILITY OF LOCAL CONFLICTS. THE WITHDRAWAL OF UK FORCES FROM MALTA COULD CONTRIBUTE TO INSTABILITY IN THE AREA. DESPITE THESE PROBLEMS THE OBJECTIVE OF ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT MUST BE PURSUED IN SOUTHERN EUROPE, IN PART BECAUSE OF THE DIRECT RELATIONSHIP OF ECONOMIC TO SECURITY ISSUES. THE POLITICAL FUTURE OF YUGOSLAVIA WAS OF PARTICULAR CONCERN TO ITALY, AND FORLANI BELIEVED THAT CONTINUING EXCHANGE OF VIEWS ON THIS ISSUE SHOULD TAKE PLACE WITHIN THE ALLIANCE. WHILE THE SOVIETS WOULD INEVITABLY ATTEMPT TO EXTEND THEIR INFLUENCE IN YUGOSLAVIA, THE TRANSFER OF POWER COULD TAKE PLACE THERE IN CONDITIONS OF STABILITY, AND THE ALLIANCE MUST MAKE EVERY EFFORT TO ENCOURAGE THIS OUTCOME. HE HOPED ITALIAN AGREEMENTS WITH YUGOSLAVIA WOULD CONTRIBUTE TO EVEN BETTER RELATIONS. FORLANI SAID THE CHALLENGES OF DEFENSE AND SECURITY AND THE DEVELOPMENT OF DETENTE REQUIRE CONSTANT ADAPTATION BY THE ALLIES. ATLANTIC SOLIDARITY WAS A PRECONDITION OF ALLIED SECURITY AND SHOULD BE DEVELOPED THROUGH NEW PROPOSALS THAT WOULD HIGHLIGHT NEW VALUES AND INTERESTS OF THE WEST.

17. BITSIOS (GREECE) SAID THAT WITH THE ESTABLISHMENT OF NUCLEAR PARITY, THERE WAS INEVITABLY AN INCREASED EMPHASIS ON CONVENTIONAL FORCES, AN AREA WHERE THE SOVIETS HAD AN ADVANTAGE AND WHERE THE ECONOMIC PROBLEMS OF THE WEST MAKE IT DIFFICULT FOR THE ALLIANCE TO MEET THE SOVIET CHALLENGE. BUT THE WEST SHOULD RECOGNIZE THAT THE SOVIETS HAVE THEIR OWN PROBLEMS WITH CHINA, WHERE THE LEADERSHIP CHANGES APPEAR NOT TO HAVE HELPED THE SOVIETS, WITH DEVELOPMENTS IN WESTERN COMMUNIST PARTIES, AND WITH EASTERN EUROPEAN COUNTRIES INCLUDING ROMANIA. TURNING TO BELGRADE, BITSIOS SAID  
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THE ALLIES SHOULD CONTINUE TO COORDINATE THEIR VIEWS WITH THE AIM OF BRINGING THE SOVIETS TO CARRY OUT BASKET III OBLIGATIONS. IT WAS IMPORTANT FOR THE



WEST TO KEEP THE FOCUS AT BELGRADE ON IMPLEMENTATION AND NOT TO ALLOW THE SOVIETS TO ENLARGE THE SUBJECT MATTER AND TO DIVERT ATTENTION FROM THIS CENTRAL ISSUE.

18. FOLLOWING THE RESTORATION OF DEMOCRATIC INSTITUTIONS IN GREECE, BITSIOS NOTED, PRIME MINISTER CARAMANLIS HAD LAUNCHED AN INITIATIVE TO DEVELOP COOPERATION AMONG BALKAN COUNTRIES. THE INITIAL MEETING HED ACHIEVED CERTAIN POSITIVE RESULTS, ALTHOUGH THE POSTURE OF BULGARIA HAD NOT BEEN HELPFUL. UNDERLINING THE IMPORTANCE OF FUTURE DEVELOPMENTS IN YUGOSLAVIA, BITSIOS NOTED POSSIBLE ASCENDENCY OF CENTRIFUGAL OR ORTHODOX PRO-MOSCOW FORCES IN THAT COUNTRY. THE INDEPENDENCE AND NON-ALIGNMENT OF YUGOSLAVIA IS OF CENTRAL IMPORTANCE TO THE ALLIANCE AND THIS MESSAGE MUST BE UNDERSTOOD BY THE SOVIET UNION. COMMENTING BRIEFLY ON DEVELOPMENTS IN ALBANIA, BITSIOS NOTED THE APPARENT RETICENCE OF THE ALBANIAN LEADERSHIP TOWARD THE NEW GOVERNMENT IN POWER, ALBANIAN CONCERN ABOUT THE POSSIBILITY OF ANY FUTURE MOVES BY YUGOSLAVIA TOWARD THE SOVIET CAMP, AND THE INCLINATION OF THE ALBANIANS TO IMPROVE RELATIONS WITH SOME OF ITS NEIGHBORS. GREECE FOR ITS PART WAS SEEKING TO ESTABLISH A RELATIONSHIP OF UNDERSTANDING WITH ALBANIA, EVEN THOUGH A RELATIONSHIP OF CONFIDENCE WAS NOT YET POSSIBLE.

19. BITSIOS REGRETTED THAT THERE HAD BEEN NO PROGRESS IN THE CYPRUS NEGOTIATIONS AND THAT IT HAD NOT YET BEEN POSSIBLE TO ADDRESS THE TERRITORIAL ISSUES INVOLVED. HE SPOKE FAVORABLY OF THE PROGRESS ACHIEVED AT BERN REGARDING PROCEDURES FOR GREEK-TURKISH DISCUSSIONS OF THE AEGEAN CONTINENTAL SHELF, NOTED FAILURE TO ACHIEVE A BREAKTHROUGH AT PARIS REGARDING GREEK-TURKISH AIR SPACE PROBLEMS, AND EXPRESSED THE HOPE THAT HIS CONTACTS WITH HIS TURKISH COLLEAGUE WOULD CONTRIBUTE TO FURTHER PROGRESS. IF TURKEY ADOPTED A REASONABLE AND FORTHCOMING APPROACH, IT WOULD FIND FULL RECIPROCITY IN ATHENS. BITSIOS CONCLUDED BY PAYING TRIBUTE TO THE CONTRIBUTION  
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OF THE SECRETARY'S STRONG PERSONALITY TO THE ALLIANCE.

20. ANDERSEN(DENMARK) SAID THAT WESTERN PUBLIC OPINION NOW SEES THAT CSCE WILL NOT CHANGE EAST/WEST RELATIONS OVERNIGHT AND, IN ADDITION, THE CONTINUED WP MILITARY BUILD-UP HAS REINFORCED DOUBTS ABOUT THE EAST'S INTENTIONS. A NUMBER OF FACTORS ON THE WESTERN SIDE HAVE ALSO SLOWED PROGRESS ON DETENTE, SUCH AS ECONOMIC PROBLEMS AND ELECTIONS IN CERTAIN COUNTRIES. WITH REGARD TO THE WP BUILD-UP, ANDERSEN SAID IT WOULD BE DANGEROUS IF THE WESTERN PUBLIC GOT THE IMPRESSION

THAT THE GAP BETWEEN WESTERN DEFENSE NEEDS AND PRESENT STRENGTH WAS UNBRIDGEABLE. ANDERSEN BELIEVED THAT THE SOVIETS CONTINUE TO DESIRE STABLE RELATIONS WITH THE WEST, BUT THE WEST CANNOT ACCEPT SUCH WP PROPAGANDA PROPOSALS AS A TREATY ON NON-FIRST-USE OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS. THE WEST SHOULD NOT ADOPT THE SAME TACTICS, BUT RATHER SHOULD ADVANCE REALISTIC ARMS CONTROL PROPOSALS SO AS NOT TO BE ON THE DEFENSIVE IN THE FACE OF SOVIET INITIATIVES. ANDERSEN ALSO STRESSED THE IMPORTANCE OF CLOSE COOPERATION WITH NEUTRAL COUNTRIES IN PREPARATIONS FOR BELGRADE.

21. ANDERSEN SAID THAT THE WEST SHOULD ADOPT A MORE OPEN ATTITUDE TOWARD THIRD WORLD DEMANDS, AND WELCOMED US INITIATIVES IN SOUTHERN AFRICA. HE NOTED THAT HE HAD RECENTLY SPOKEN TO ZIMBABWE LEADER BISHOP MUZOREWA AND TO SWAPO LEADERS, WHO ALL HAD EXPRESSED WILLINGNESS TO COOPERATE. ANDERSEN ALSO REPORTED THAT SUDANESE PRESIDENT NUMAYRI HAD RECENTLY STRESSED TO HIM THE IMPORTANCE OF BRINGING THE ANGOLAN REGIME OUT OF ITS ISOLATION. IN A SUBSEQUENT VISIT TO ANGOLA, ANDERSEN SAID HE HAD BEEN ABLE TO CONFIRM NUMAYRI'S VIEW THROUGH PERSONAL OBSERVATION. THE WEST SHOULD INTENSIFY ITS EFFORTS TO NORMALIZE RELATIONS WITH ANGOLA, WHOSE LEADERS ANDERSEN BELIEVED TRULY DESIRE NONALIGNMENT AND CLOSER TIES WITH THE WEST. THEY HAD EXPRESSED TO HIM AN AWARENESS OF THE DANGERS OF THE LARGE CUBAN MILITARY PRESENCE AND OF OVERDEPENDENCE OF THE USSR. THUS, THE WEST HAS A CHANCE TO REGAIN LOST GROUND IN ANGOLA. IN CLOSING, ANDERSEN PAID TRIBUTE TO SECRETARY KISSINGER, WHO HE SAID WILL HAVE A "SECURE PLACE" IN THE HISTORY OF THIS CENTURY.

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22. MEDEIROS FERREIRA (PORTUGAL) SAID THAT HE COULD ASSURE THE ALLIES OF PORTUGAL'S COMMITMENT TO NATO, OF WHICH THE PLANNED PORTUGUESE BRIGADE FOR NATO IS CONCRETE PROOF. HE THANKED THE ALLIES FOR THE AID ALREADY DELIVERED AS WELL AS FOR ASSISTANCE PROMISED FOR THIS UNIT. MEDEIROS FERREIRA EXPRESSED MISTRUST OF THE RECENT WP PROPOSALS WHICH, HE SAID, WERE AIMED AT UNDERMINING NATO STRATEGY AND AT DEFLECTING CRITICISM OF THE EAST'S CSCE PERFORMANCE. HE ALSO WAS SUSPICIOUS OF SOVIET MOTIVES IN AFRICA, AND BELIEVED THE WEST SHOULD SHOW SYMPATHY WITH THE ASPIRATIONS OF THE THIRD WORLD. FINALLY, MEDEIROS FERREIRA SAID HE HOPED THE BELGRADE MEETINGS WOULD CONTRIBUTE TO AN IMPROVEMENT IN EAST/WEST RELATIONS AND WOULD ALSO GIVE THE WEST AN OPPORTUNITY TO STRENGTHEN ITS OWN COHESION THROUGH CONSULTATIONS.

23. SYG LUNCS REFERRED TO THE PORTUGUESE FOMIN'S

REMARKS ABOUT HIS COUNTRY'S EFFORTS TO MODERNIZE ITS MILITARY FORCES AND APPEALED TO THE ALLIES TO ASSIST PORTUGAL.

24. VAN ELSLANDE (BELGIUM) EXPRESSED UNCERTAINTY ABOUT WHETHER EAST/WEST MILITARY EQUILIBRIUM CONTINUES TO EXIST IN THE LIGHT OF WHAT HAS RECENTLY BEEN SAID ABOUT THE EASTERN BUILD-UP. IF IN FACT THE EQUILIBRIUM NO LONGER EXISTS, VAN ELSLANDE BELIEVED PARLIAMENTS AND THE PUBLIC SHOULD BE INFORMED OF THIS SO THAT AN APPROPRIATE RESPONSE CAN BE MADE. IF THE WEST MUST STRENGTHEN ITS DEFENSES, THERE WILL PROBABLY BE A COOLING IN EAST/WEST RELATIONS. SO AS TO HELP GOVERNMENTS IN DECIDING HOW TO RESPOND TO THE EASTERN BUILD-UP, VAN ELSLANDE ASKED THAT THE NATO INTERNATIONAL STAFF PREPARE A STUDY AIMED A ASSESSING THE MILITARY BALANCE.

25. SYG LUNS RESPONDED THAT SUCH A STUDY WOULD BE PREPARED BUT HE DID NOT AGREE WITH THE BELGIAN FONMIN'S VIEW THAT A MORE VIGOROUS WESTERN DEFENSE EFFORT MIGHT WEAKEN THE DETENTE PROCESS. WHILE MILITARY EQUILBRIUM STILL DOES EXIST, LUNS SAID, IT IS IN DANGER OF BEING UPSET BECUASE OF THE TREND IN EASTERN DEFENSE EXPENDITURES.

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26. VAN ELSLANDE, RESUMING HIS INTEVENTION, NOTED THAT COMPETITION BETWEEN THE WEST AND THE COMMUNIST WORLD HAD SHIFTED TO AFRICA. THIS IS BECUASE CERTAIN REGIMES IN SOURTHERN AFRICA CLING TO THE COLONIAL SYSTEM, AND WE HAVE TAKEN NO SERIOUS STEPS TO CORRECT THE SITUATION. THE WEST MUST MAKE EVERY EFFORT TO ENCOURAGE MODERATE REGIMES IN RHODESIA, SOUTH AFRICA AND NAMIBIA AND SHOULD CONSULT ON HOW TO ASSIST THE MODERATES. WITH REGARD TO DETENTE, THE ALLIES MUST TAKE ACCOUNT OF PUBLIC OPINION. BELGRADE SHOULD CONCENTRAGE ON TAKING STOCK ON WHAT HAS BEEN DONE. THE ALLIES SHOULD HAVE AN OFFENSIVE STRATEGY AS GENSCHER SUGGESTED AND SHOULD HAVE CONCRETE PROPOSALS SUCH AS THE BELGIAN IDEA FOR CREATION OF A PAN-EUROPEAN COURT OF HUMAN RIGHTS. VAN ELSLANDE SAID HE HAD NO ILLUSIONS ABOUT THE POSSIBILITIES FOR SUCCESS OF SUCH AN INITIATIVE, BUT IF THE OTHER SIDE IS TO MAKE NEW PROPOSALS, THE WEST SHOULD BE PREPARED WITH SOMETHING POSITIVE.

27. CHAIRMAN OF THE MILITARY COMMITTEE (ADMIRAL HILL-NORTON), IN RESPONSE TO VAN ELSLANDE'S EARLIER QUESTIONS, NOTED THAT THE BALANCE BETWEEN NATO AND WP FORCES FIVE YEARS FROM NOW WOULD EPEND ON DECISIONS TAKEN TODAY. PROJECTIONS WHICH HAVE BEEN EXPLAINED THIS WEEK SHOW WHAT

THIS BALANCE IS LIKELY TO BE, AND RAISE PROBLEMS WHICH MUST BE RESOLVED AT THE POLITICAL LEVEL. THE RESOURCES OF THE WEST ARE MORE THAN AMPLE, BUT DISTRIBUTION AND PRIORITIES FOR EXPENDITURES ARE A PROBLEM. THERE IS NO DOUBT AT THE PRESENT TIME AS TO THE VIABILITY OF NATO STRATEGY, BUT THE BALANCE IS TILTING AGAINST NATO, WHICH COULD LEAD TO DOUBTS ON BOTH SIDES AS TO THE CREDIBILITY OF THIS STRATEGY. NATO IS HEAVILY OUTNUMBERED BUT AHEAD IN QUALITY. HOWEVER, THE SOVIETS SPEND THREE TIMES AS MUCH AS THE US AND TWICE AS MUCH AS ALL OF NATO ON RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT. THIS IS RAPIDLY CLOSING THE QUALITY GAP, AND THE RESULTS ARE PREDICTABLE.

28. FRYDENLUND (NORWAY) AGREED THAT MAINTENANCE OF THE BALANCE OF POWER WAS A PREREQUISITE TO DETENTE. HE NOTED THE CURRENT STAGNATION IN EAST/WEST RELATIONS AND THE PUBLIC SKEPTICISM ABOUT DETENTE AND HELSINKI, BUT THOUGHT THESE  
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MIGHT BE DUE TO THE FACT THAT THEY ARE BOTH LONG-TERM PROCESSES. THE STRATEGIC IMPORTANCE OF THE NORTHERN AREAS IS GROWING AS SHOWN BY THE SOVIET MILITARY CONCENTRATION ON THE KOLA PENINSULA, INCREASED SOVIET ACTIVITY IN NORTHERN SEAS AND THE PRESENCE OF OIL IN THE NORTH. AS A CONSEQUENCE, NORWAY'S RELATIONSHIP WITH THE SOVIET UNION HAS TAKEN ON INCREASING IMPORTANCE. NORWAY CONSIDERS ALLIED CONSULTATIONS MOST VALUABLE IN THIS REGARD, BUT UNRESOLVED QUESTIONS REMAIN WITH THE SOVIETS, E.G., THE LINE DELIMITING CONTINENTAL SHELF RIGHTS IN THE BARENTS SEA. A NEW ROUND OF TALKS ON THIS SUBJECT WOULD TAKE PLACE NEXT MONTH BUT WITHOUT MUCH HOPE OF SUCCESS. DISAGREEMENTS REMAIN OVER THE VALBARD AND OTHER ISSUES. FRYDENLUND SAID HE DID NOT WISH TO DRAMATIZE THE SITUATION IN THE AREA, WHICH WAS TRADITIONALLY CHARACTERIZED BY LOW TENSION, BUT THE PROBLEMS CONTINUED TO BE A MAJOR CONCERN TO NORWAY.

29. VAN DER STOEL (NETHERLANDS) NOTED THAT THE BRIEFING GIVEN TO THE DPC INDICATED THE WP POSSESSES MORE FORCES THAN IT LEGITIMATELY REQUIRES FOR SELF-DEFENSE, BUT ALL NATO COUNTRIES FACE SEVERE BUDGETARY PRESSURES, NATO SHOULD THEREFORE GIVE PRIORITY TO RATIONAL USE OF DEFENSE EXPENDITURES. ON BELGRADE, VAN DER STOEL STRESSED THAT EVALUATION OF IMPLEMENTATION SHOULD REMAIN THE CENTRAL ELEMENT OF THE REVIEW MEETING, BUT JUDGMENTS SHOULD NOT BE MADE ON A BLOC-TO-BLOC BASIS WHICH WOULD GIVE TOO MUCH ATTENTION TO CENTRAL SOVIET ROLE. BELGRADE SHOULD ALSO MAKE FURTHER PROGRESS, NOT THROUGH COMPLETELY NEW PROPOSALS BUT THROUGH IDEAS FOR IMPROVING PERFORMANCE ON AGREED PROVISIONS. THE POLANDS SHOULD LOOK INTO THIS MORE CAREFULLY, TAKING ACCOUNT OF THE VIEWS OF THE NEUTRALS. THE EC-NINE AN

NATO SHOULD RETAIN THE EXISTING PRACTICAL ARRANGEMENTS  
FOR CONSULTATIONS AMONG THEM.

30. ON MBFR, VA DER STOEL STRESSED IMPORTANCE OF  
RESPONDING TO WARSAW PACT PRESENTATION OF DATA ON  
MANPOWER. THS WAS A SMALL OPENING BUT COULD LEAD TO  
AN UNDERSTANDING ON FIGURES TO BE USED AS A BASIS FOR AGREE-  
MENT. THE WEST SHOULD TAKE ADVANTAGE OF THIS OPENING BY  
PUTTING FORWARD ITS OWN FIGURES. SINCE MBFR WAS A NATO  
INITIATIVE, THE PUBLIC WOULD NOT UNDERSTAND I IT APPEARED  
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TO BE HOLDING UP PROGRESS. VA DER STOEL ALSO NOTED THAT  
ALL ALLIES AGREED THE WP PROPOSAL ON NON-FIRST-USE OF  
NUCLEAR WEAPONS WAS UNACCEPTABLE SINCE IT WOULD REMOVE THE  
BASIS OF NATO'S PRESENT DETERRENT STRATEGY. BUT THIS  
SHOULD NOT MEAN THE NON-FIRST-USE CONCEPT WAS WHOLLY IMPOSSIBLE  
IF THERE WERE REAL PROGRESS ON ARMS CONTROL, REDUCTIONS IN  
LEVELS OF ARMS AND A REDUCED ROLE FOR NUCLEAR WEAPONS.  
THE NETHERLANDS CONSIDRS IT IMPORTANT FOR WESTERN  
COUNTRIES TO EXTEND THEIR ECONOMIC TIES WITH YUGOSLAVIA.  
ON NORTH/SOUTH DIALOGUE, VA DER STOEL SAID THE WEST SHOULD  
AGREE ON SOME SIGNAL WHICH WOULD CONVEY THE IMPORTANCE  
THEY ATTACH TO NORTH/SOUTH RELATIONS AND THE NORTH/SOUTH  
DIALOGUE. VAN DER STOEL ALSO SUGGESTED THAT ALLIES SHOULD  
CONSULT AMOONG THEMSELVES ON HOW TO PRESS FURTHER FOR  
MODERATE SOLUTIONS IN SOUTHERN AFRICA.

31. JAMIESON (CANADA) ASSURED ALLIES CANADA CONTINUES  
TO BE A STRONG SUPPORTER OF NATO, AND EXPRESSED PARTICULAR  
INTEREST IN NORWEGIAN COMMENTS ON ARTIC AREAS WHICH ARE  
OF MAJOR CONCERN ALSO TO CANADA. HE CONSIDERED THAT  
WESTERN DILEMMA ON DETENTE DERIVES FROM DIFFICULTY OF  
DEFINING IT AND RESULTING SKEPTICISM OF WESTERN PUBLIC  
OPINION. PUBLIC DOES NOT SEE A DIFFERENCE BETWEEN  
DETENTE AND COLD WAR SINCE THE SOVIETS CONTINUE THEIR  
ARMS BUILD-UP AND IDEOLGOCIAL WARFARE AND THERE ARE NO  
PARALLEL IMPROVEMENTS IN HUMAN RIGHTS. CANADA HAS BEGUN  
A PROGRAM OF CONTACTS WITH EASTERN GOVERNMENTS TO CONVEY  
THE MESSAGE THAT UNLESS THERE IS PROGRESS ON HUMAN RIGHTS  
AND BASKET III THERE COULD BE A LOSS OF PUBLIC SUPPORT  
FOR DETENTE IN GENERAL. THIS MINISTERIAL SHOULD CLEARLY  
STATE THAT DETENTE COULD STAGNATE, AND SHOULD PLACE THE  
BLAME FOR THIS ON THE SOVIETS. THE ALLIES SHOULD NOT ALLOW  
THE SOVIETS TO DEFLECT ATTENTION FROM IMPLEMENTATION OF  
THE CSCE THROUGH FOCUSING ON THEIR OWN GRANDIOSE NEW  
PROPOSALS SUCH AS NON-FIRST-USE OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS.  
THIS PROPOSAL STRIKES AT THE BASIS OF NATO STRATEGY.  
ALLIES SHOULD REJECT IT IN THE COMMUNIQUE AND PUT EMPHASIS  
ON THE NEED FOR REAL DISARMAMENT MEASURES. JAMIESON SAID

CANADA SUPPORTS UK/US EFFORTS IN SOUTHERN AFRICA AND AGREES ENTIRELY WITH UK DECISION NOT TO SEND TROOPS TO RHODESIA. HOWEVER, SHOULD COMMONWEALTH ACTION IN SECRET

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RHODESIA APPEAR APPROPRIATE AT SOME POINT, CANADA IS PREPARED TO PARTICIPATE. JAMIESON CLOSED BY CITING "MONUMENTAL ACCOMPLISHMENTS" OF SECRETARY KISSINGER DURING HIS TENURE AND THE STRENGTHENING OF US-CANDIAN BONDS DURING THIS PERIOD.

32. AGUSTSSON (ICELAND) WELCOMED THE MESSAGE FROM PRESIDENT-ELECT CARTER AND THE AFFIRMATION OF CONTINUITY IN THE US COMMITMENT TO THE ALLIANCE WHICH WAS OF GREAT IMPORTANCE TO ICELAND. HE EXPRESSED SATISFACTION WITH NATO CONSULTATIONS ON CSCE WHICH HE WAS SURE WOULD CONTRIBUTE TO SUCCESSFUL ALLIED PARTICIPATION IN THE BELGRADE MEETINGS. AGUSTSSON WAS PLEASED TO NOTE THE SUPPORT OF ALLIES FOR MODERATE INFLUENCES IN AFRICA AND WISHED THE UK AND US SUCCESS IN THEIR EFFORTS IN THIS AREA. IN CONCLUDING, AGUSTSSON EXPRESSED SYMPATHY TO THE UK REGARDING THE PROBLEM OF SOVIET FISHING IN BRITISH WATERS--A PROBLEM HE HOPED THE UK WOULD BE ABLE TO RESOLVE AMICABLY. CROSLAND (UK) ASKED WRYLTY WHETHER AGUSTSSON WAS SUGGESTING THAT THE UK PERMANENTLY EXPEL ALL SOVIET FISHING VESSELS FROM UK WATERS, OR WHETHER THE EXPULSION SHOULD ONLY BE FOR A NON-MONTH COLLING-OFF PERIOD. LUNS SUGGESTED THAT THIS ISSUE BE PURSUED ON ANOTHER OCCASION, AND THE UK AND ICELANDIC MINISTERS AGREED.

33. DE GUIRINGAUD (FRANCE) SAW NO NEED FOR EXCESSIVE PESSIMISM REGARDING THE CURRENT STATE OF DETENTE. THE WEST WAS NOT IN A POSITION OF INFERIORITY IN ITS ABILITY TO MAKE ITS VOICE HEARD IN THE CURRENT DIALOGUE. FRANCE WAS PURSUING BILATERAL DISCUSSIONS WITH THE SOVIETS AND OTHER EASTERN EUROPEANS REGARDING IMPLEMENTATION OF THE FINAL ACT. AS BELGRADE APPROACHES, FRANCE BELIEVED IT WAS ESSENTIAL TO UNDERLINE THE IMPORTANCE OF INDEPENDENT ACTION TO DEVELOP EAST/WEST RELATIONS AND THE PROCESS OF DETENTE. IN THIS REGARD, DE GUIRINGAUD CITED THE FIFTH PARAGRAPH OF THE RECENT FRENCH-YUGOSLAV COMMUNIQUE, WHICH PLACED HEAVY EMPHASIS ON NON-INTERFERENCE IN INTERNAL AFFAIRS, A CONCEPT TO WHICH THE YUGOSLAVS FULLY SUBSCRIBED.

34. DE GUIRINGAUD THOUGHT IT WAS NATURAL THAT THERE HAD BEEN ONLY MODEST EASTERN IMPLEMENTATION OF THE FINAL ACT 18 MONTHS AFTER HELSINKI. THE ALLIES SHOULD TAKE NOTE, SECRET

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HE BELIEVED, THAT THE EASTERN EUROPEANS HAD NOT RENEGED ON THEIR HELSINKI COMMITMENTS AND THAT THERE WERE MODEST SIGNS OF EASTERN EFFORTS TO HONOR THESE COMMITMENTS. THE MAIN EFFORT AT BELGRADE, DE GUIRINGAUD BELIEVED, SHOULD BE TO LEND NEW IMPULSE TOWARD IMPLEMENTATION OF THE FINAL ACT. HE NOTED THE COHESION OF THE NINE IN PREPARATIONS FOR BELGRADE, WHICH HAD CONTRIBUTED TO ALLIANCE EFFORTS IN THIS AREA.

35. DE GUIRINGAUD EMPHASIZED THE NEED NOT TO RELAX ALLIED VIGILANCE IN THE PURSUIT OF DETENTE. ALL ALLIES HAD RESPONSIBILITIES IN THIS AREA, AND FRANCE WAS CONTRIBUTING THROUGH ITS CURRENT PROGRAM TO IMPROVE ITS CONVENTIONAL FORCES AND TO MAINTAIN THE CREDIBILITY OF ITS NUCLEAR FORCE. WHILE MAINTAINING ITS COMMITMENT TO THE ALLIES, FRANCE WOULD MAINTAIN THE INDEPENDENCE OF ITS NUCLEAR FORCE AND ITS DECISIONS ON ENGAGEMENT OF FRENCH FORCES.

36. DE GUIRINGAUD NOTED THAT THERE WAS NO SIGN OF SOVIET INTENT TO RELAX ITS MILITARY POSTURE IN CENTRAL EUROPE. WHILE IMPROVEMENT IN THE CAPABILITY OF THESE FORCES RAISED DIFFICULT QUESTIONS, THE ALLIES SHOULD RECOGNIZE THAT THESE IMPROVEMENTS WERE NOT A NEW DEVELOPMENT BUT RATHER PART OF A LONG-TERM SOVIET EFFORT TO CONSOLIDATE ITS POSITION IN EUROPE. NEVERTHELESS, THE ALLIES MUST MAINTAIN A STRONG DEFENSE AND NOT PERMIT THE DEVELOPMENT OF DISEQUILIBRIUM IN POWER. THE ALLIES MUST ALSO NOT IGNORE SOVIET ACTIVITIES DIRECTED AGAINST WESTERN INTERESTS IN AFRICA, INCLUDING THE DELIVERY OF SOVIET WEAPONS TO CERTAIN AFRICAN REGIMES, TO WHICH THE FRENCH WERE CERTAINLY NOT INDIFFERENT.

37. THE WARSAW PACT NON-FIRST-USE PROPOSAL MADE IT UNNECESSARY,  
DE GUIRINGAUD SAID, TO DISPEL ANY UNCERTAINTIES REGARDING ALLIED DETERMINATION TO MAINTAIN THEIR DETERRENT CAPABILITY. GIVEN THE CONVENTIONAL SUPERIORITY OF THE WARSAW PACT, FRANCE WAS CERTAINLY NOT WILLING TO SUBSCRIBE TO SUCH A PROPOSAL. INDEED, THE SOVIETS HAD NOT ANTICIPATED A POSITIVE ALLIED RESPONSE, BUT INTENDED TO USE THEIR PROPOSAL FOR PROPAGANDA PURPOSES. THIS, THE NAC  
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COMMUNIQUE SHOULD PROVIDE A CLEAR RESPONSE TO THE WARSAW PACT SO THAT WESTERN PUBLIC OPINION WOULD UNDERSTAND THE ALLIED POSITION. THIS WAS TRUE AS WELL FOR THE WP PROPOSAL NOT TO ENLARGE NATO OR THE WP, A PROPOSAL TO WHICH FRANCE WOULD NOT SUBSCRIBE. IN CONCLUSION, DE GUIRINGAUD

COMMENDED THE CONTRIBUTION OF SECRETARY KISSINGER TO THE ALLIANCE AND WELCOMED THE MESSAGE FROM PRESIDENT-ELECT CARTER WHICH, HE BELIEVED, WOULD ENCOURAGE ALL THE ALLIES TO REINFORCE THEIR EFFORTS TO PROMOTE WESTERN SECURITY.

38. SYG LUNS SAID HE WOULD SUMMARIZE THE MINISTERS' STATEMENTS WHEN THE SESSION RESUMED. (LUNS' SUMMARY WILL BE TRANSMITTED BY SEPTTEL.) BEFORE CONCLUDING, HOWEVER, HE WISHED TO STRESS THE NEED FOR ALL ALLIES TO REDOUBLE THEIR EFFORTS TO CONSERVE ENERGY RESOURCES. ALLIED COUNTRIES WERE CONSUMING ENERGY AT A FASTER RATE THAN BEFORE THE '73 CRISIS AND WERE THEREFORE IN A POSITION OF INCREASED VULNERABILITY. IT WAS IMPERATIVE THAT THE ALLIANCE NOT WAIT FOR ANOTHER CRISIS BEFORE TACKLING SERIOUSLY THE NEED TO CONSERVE ENERGY RESOURCES. STRAUZ-HUPE UNQUOTE KISSINGER

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